Semantic Incompleteness, Modal Anxiety and Necessity

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1. Introduction

1.1 Perspectival Claims
A central debate in philosophy of language and linguistics concerns *perspectival* expressions and claims, i.e. expressions and claims whose extension depends on a contextually salient perspective. Examples include predicates of personal taste ('delicious', 'fun'), aesthetic predicates ('beautiful') and epistemic modals ('might', 'must', 'possibly'). The orthodox approach to perspectival claims in truth-conditional semantics is indexical contextualism. According to this view, the relevant perspective is determined by the context of utterance, and it manifests itself at the level of the content expressed by the utterance. On this approach, a claim of personal taste such as (1) is standardly taken to mean (2):

(1) Spinach is tasty.
(2) Spinach is tasty for me.

This intuitively plausible picture has recently come under attack, principally due to two widely-discussed arguments: The argument from faultless disagreement,[1] and the argument from required retraction.[2] The former has been used to motivate a position called nonindexical contextualism, the latter is intended to motivate truth relativism. In this brief article, we will principally focus on matters related to the argument from faultless disagreement.

1.2 The Argument from Faultless Disagreement

Consider the following exchange, in which Mary and Frank are having a dispute about the culinary merits of spinach.

(5) Mary: Spinach is delicious.
(6) Frank: I disagree. Spinach is not delicious.

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[1] As regards the argument from faultless disagreement, cf. *inter alia* Kölbel (2004a, 2004b, 2009) and Lasersohn (2005, 2009). For responses sympathetic to contextualism, cf. Glanzberg (2007); Schaffer (2009); Stojanovic (2007); Sundell (2011) and Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009)

[2] Cf. in particular MacFarlane (2007, 2014). For interesting discussion focusing also on epistemic modals, see Egan, Hawthorne, and Weatherson (2005), Egan (2007), Schaffer (2009), Dowell (2011) and Yanovich (2013). .

Mary and Frank, it appears, are in disagreement. Yet neither of them is at fault in so far as neither speaker needs to revise their beliefs or retract their assertion. If the possibility of such faultless disagreement is an important characteristic of disputes about taste, it seems, indexicalist contextualism comes under pressure. The indexicalist can account for faultlessness, since both Mary and Frank express a speaker-relative content. Disagreement, however, is lost, as becomes apparent once the perspectives that tacitly feature in the asserted contents are made explicit.

The possibility of faultless disagreement in subjective discourse motivate nonindexical contextualism. On this view, the relevant perspective is also drawn from the context of utterance, yet it is anchored not in the content but in the circumstance of evaluation. The content expressed by utterances invoking predicates of personal taste are taste-neutral, i.e. their content is exactly what the explicitly phonetisized sentence suggests it to be. Since the perspective-neutral content of an utterance of 'Spinach is delicious' and the content of 'Spinach is not delicious' stand in direct contradiction, disagreement is accounted for. Faultlessness is explained by the different truth-values of the two claims. 'Spinach is delicious' is true with respect to Mary's perspective, yet false with respect to Frank's, and vice versa for its negation. Hence, neither Frank nor Mary need to revise their beliefs or retract their assertions.

1.3 Disagreement

Intuitively, two individuals are in disagreement if some of their beliefs are doxastically noncotenable. This understanding of disagreement presupposes a classical conception of propositions, according to which the objects of belief, assertion and dis/agreement are true with respect to a world and a world only. However, since nonindexicalism and relativism attempt to motivate an extra parameter in the circumstance, we require a definition of disagreement that can accommodate nonclassical propositions. For this purpose, it is helpful to follow Recanati (2007) in conceiving of the truth-conditionally complete content as distributed over two aspects: the lekton (or, roughly, Kaplanian content) and the circumstance of evaluation. The approach is neatly captured by two principles:

> **Duality**: To get a truth-value, we need a circumstance of evaluation as well as a content to evaluate. (As Austin puts it, 'It takes two to make a truth'.)[3]

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[3] Austin (1971, p. 124)

Distribution: The determinants of truth-value distribute over the two basic components truth-evaluation involves: content and circumstance. That is, a determinant of truth-value, e.g. a time, is *either* given as an ingredient of content *or* as an aspect of the circumstance of evaluation. (2007, pp. 33-34)

Recanati's framework provides us with *two* notions of content: The truth-conditionally complete Austinian proposition, distributed over lekton and circumstance, as well as the explicit content or lekton itself. There are thus various ways in which an argument from faultless disagreement could be spelled out in order to motivate nonindexical contextualism. Disagreement can be defined (i) in terms of conflicting Austinian propositions or, more radically, (ii) in terms of incompatible perspective-neutral lekta. Finally, one can attempt to mount an argument invoking (iii) the mere *appearance* of faultless disagreement. This last option would acknowledge that disagreement so conceived is not substantive in the sense of (i), yet refrains from the measures adopted by radicals, according to whom lekta are semantically complete and disagreement can be had in terms of such thin contents only. I consider the first option hopeless, and the third philosophically uninteresting, since indexical contextualism is just as capable of accounting for the mere *appearance* of disagreement. Though the second option is the only plausible shot for the nonindexicalist to motivate her position as a *better alternative* to indexical contextualism, its radical nature has been insufficiently addressed in the literature.

2. Radical Nonindexical Contextualism

Moderate nonindexical contextualism conceives of the objects of disagreement as truth-conditionally complete contents, distributed over lekton and circumstance. Hence, A and B disagree iff the truth of some Austinian Proposition believed or asserted by A precludes the truth of some Austinian Proposition believed or asserted by B. Naturally, if the proposition that spinach is delicious is true relative to Mary's taste or perspective, but false with respect to Frank's the interlocutors talk past each other: The value of the perspective parameter is a *constituent* of the Austinian proposition, hence two *different* propositions are at stake, or as John Perry (1986) would have it, they *concern* different perspectives.[4] However, if the perspective-

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[4] A proposition, Perry suggests, is *about* some feature F, if F is one of its propositional constituents (articulated or not). For instance, according to eternalists like Frege and Evans, propositions or 'thoughts' always include a temporal specification, even if only tacitly so, and are thus always about particular times. Alternatively, a proposition can be said to *concern* F, if its truth value depends on how things stand as regards F. That's how a temporalist

neutral lekton by itself exhausts the semantic content expressed, a genuine contradiction can arise at that level. Since the circumstance does not play a role on this view of semantic content, A and B are in disagreement iff the explicit contents entertained or asserted by the two parties cannot be true with respect to *any single* circumstance of evaluation.

2.1 The Incompleteness Worry
Given that a moderate version of nonindexical contextualism can at best account for faultless misunderstanding, and given – as I will here assume – that an argument from the *appearance* of faultless disagreement has little bite, the radical strategy might hold most promise for advocates of nonindexicalist contextualism. However, the thin content picture this strategy invokes is deeply contentious. Evans famously scoffed at the idea that a time-neutral sentence such as 'Socrates is sitting' can 'express a complete meaning' and considered it 'such a strange position that it is difficult to believe that anyone has ever held it' (1985, p. 348).[5] The worry is this: If disagreement consists in incompatible *lekta*, and if we assume uniformity as regards the objects of assertion, belief and disagreement, then doubts arise whether propositions or contents so conceived might not rather be too thin to fulfil their role in propositional attitudes. Differently put, given the outsourcing of relevant aspects of the full truth-conditional meaning from the content into the circumstance, one might wonder whether the impoverished explicit content, the lekton, by itself is still sufficiently fine-grained to explain our attitudes and the actions they drive.

Propositions conceived as neutral with respect to world, time, location and taste, can be deemed *incomplete* in so far as we don't know at which circumstance to evaluate them. Consequently, the propositional attitude attributed is also rather coarse-grained, which sits poorly with our ordinary linguistic habits and our attitudes and actions more generally. If, for instance, all we know is that Sam thinks it's raining, yet are in the dark as regards the location, we are in no position to know what he believes, predict how he will act, or explain why he acts as he does. Similarly, if we don't know with regards

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understands tensed propositions: Their content is standardly time-neutral, but they *concern* a particular time. If Mary utters the time-neutral sentence 'Socrates is sitting' at midday, it concerns that specific time since its truth must be evaluated with respect to the world and the time of utterance.

[5] Does anyone actually propose such a picture as regards perspective-neutral sentences? I think there is clear evidence that a view like this is advocated by authors such as Kölbel (2004b), Richard (2004, 2008, 2011) and Lasersohn (2005, 2009) to name but a few. MacFarlane treads more carefully, and though I will not argue my case here in detail, I believe that his brand of assessment-sensitive relativism is just as afflicted by the incompleteness worry as radical nonindexicalism.

to which taste or judge to evaluate Mary's assertion that spinach is tasty, we cannot say what *she* believes vis-à-vis the culinary features of spinach, or with regards to *whose* tastes we must understand and evaluate her utterance. What to prepare for dinner? Capellen & Hawthorne, for instance, voice the worry thus:

> There is something of a strain in accepting that each such thin semantic value cuts the space of possibility into the worlds where it is true and the worlds where it is not, grounded in felt uneasiness at answering very simple questions about what it would take for a thin semantic value to be true. (For example, would *Jill is ready* be true at a world where she was ready to play golf, but not ready to get married? [...]) It is immensely tempting to deny that these kinds of objects reach the level of propositionality. (2009, pp. 37-38)

MacFarlane himself is aware of the problem, which he summarizes thus:

> One might try to cash out an "incompleteness" worry in the following way. Propositions are supposed to be the contents of beliefs and other propositional attitudes. But if we specify the content of someone's belief in a way that does not settle what is relevant to the accuracy of the belief, we have not given its complete content. [...] A location-neutral, time-neutral, or taste-neutral content would only incompletely determine the conditions for an attitude to be accurate, and so could not be the complete content of the attitude. (2014, p. 86)

3. MacFarlane's Argument

According to MacFarlane, the worry overgenerates. Since his, to my knowledge, is the only serious attempt to address the problem incompleteness poses for radical nonindexical contextualism (and assessment-sensitive truth relativism), I will recite his argument in full, which picks up from the lines just quoted:

> [The above] line of thought proves too much. For surely the accuracy of *any* contingent belief depends on features of the world in which the believer is situated – the world of the context of use. Even if we specify the content of Sam's belief in a way that builds in time and place – *that it is 0° C at the base of the Eiffel Tower at noon local time on February 22, 2005* – it is still not determined whether the accuracy of his belief depends on the temperature in Paris in world w_1 or on the temperature in Paris in world w_2. To know that, we would have to know not just what

Sam believes – the content of his belief – but in what context, and in particular in what world, the belief occurs.

One might respond to these considerations by bringing the world of the context of use into the *content* of Sam's thought, so that what he thinks is that it is 0∘ C at the base of the Eiffel Tower at noon local time on Februray 22, 2005, in *this* world (Schaffer, 2012). […]

[However], bringing the world of the context into the content of Sam's thought would make this content a necessary truth about this possible world, rather than a contingent truth about the weather in Paris. We should not say, then, that Sam's thought is *about* the world of the context of use. It is not *about* any particular world. (2014, pp. 86, 87)

Let's assume with MacFarlane that relativity as regards the world parameter is *not* special in any way, i.e. it has exactly the same general features as more exotic parameters such as perspectives, locations or standards of precision.[6] We should pay no heed to the incompleteness worry, the suggestion is, for doing so gives rise to considerable complications pertaining to modal logic: As soon as we build the world into the content – for instance by aid of a hidden actuality parameter or a tacit demonstrative reference to the actual world – a true contingent claim becomes a necessary truth.

MacFarlane's argument is of no help in dissolving the problem. It does nothing to *explain* how thin propositions could fulfil their role as objects of belief and assertion. As such it cannot but fail to dispel the incompleteness worry. Instead, the argument, properly spelled out, simply faces us with a choice of unpalatable options: Either make do with incomplete propositions or run into trouble with regards to modal logic. But it is not obvious that incomplete propositions are the lesser evil (an argument to this effect is not given). Facing such a trade-off, we might be much more willing to sacrifice the resources to account for faultless disagreement instead. In contrast to modal anxiety and semantic incompleteness, the latter is a comparatively unimportant phenomenon, if it rises above appearances at all. Hence, what MacFarlane passes off as an argument *against* perspective-specific contents, is much rather an argument *in favour* of *moderate* non-indexical contextualism. On this view perspectives, times, worlds etc. are all safely outsourced into the circumstance: There, they cannot wreak modal havoc, yet

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[6] As such we explicitly refrain from attempting to block the argument in ways familiar from Evans (1985, p. 351). Evans argues that the world parameter is special because there is a unique default value – the *actual* world, whereas there is no such default value for time and other parameters.

the objects of belief and assertion are complete because they consist of lekton and circumstance jointly.[7] The validity of the argument is thus spurious at best. The argument is also unsound, as I will show.

4. The Argument Reconstructed

Let's look at the argument step by step.

(P1) If time- or location-neutral propositions such as 'It's raining' are semantically incomplete, so are world-neutral propositions such as 'Paris is the capital of France in 2014' (or 'It's raining'). Differently put: *The incompleteness worry concerns all parameters alike.*

(P2) If the objects of assertion and belief must be complete propositions, they must be world-specific propositions, or propositions *about* worlds in Perry's (1986) sense. Sentences expressing a complete proposition must make mention of a particular world either explicitly or implicitly. When no world is explicitly stipulated, a hidden world argument draws a salient value from the context of utterance. Standardly, the world provided by the context is the actual world, i.e. the world at which the sentence is uttered. For instance (ignoring time), 'Paris is the capital of France' expresses the proposition 'Paris is the capital of France [in this world]' or '[Actually], Paris is the capital of France', where the modal operator 'actually' (in the following: *A*) sets the parameter for the world of evaluation to the world of utterance.[8] Hence: *Any sentence S explicitly expressing a world-neutral proposition P, in fact standardly expresses a complete proposition about the actual world, AP.*

(P3) Call a complete proposition which tacitly features the 'actually' operator (or an instance of 'in this world') an *actualized* proposition. An actualized proposition, if true, is true necessarily. No matter at which world it is evaluated, it must always be assessed with regards to the actual world, i.e. the world at which it was uttered. Let 'N' stand for the modal operator 'necessarily', such that: *AP → NAP.*

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[7] Recanati (2007), who calls this position *Strong Moderate Relativism*, defends it convincingly against incompleteness and related worries.

[8] An intuitive grasp of the 'actually' operator suffices for our purposes. For discussion of the operator's behaviour in propositional modal logic, cf. Crossley and Humberstone (1977), Gregory (2001) and Blackburn and Marx (2002). Gregory (2001, p. 61ff) is particularly pertinent for our premises P3 and P4. For 'actually' in first-order modal logic based on S5 cf. Hodes (1984), for a more general first-order modal logic treatment see Stephanou (2005).

(P4) Given (P2) and (P3): An assertion (or other tokening) of *P* in fact always expresses *AP*, which is equivalent to *NAP*. Hence, for any tokened *P, P →NAP.*

(C) Since all asserted (or otherwise tokened) propositions must be world-specific on pain of incompleteness, those which do not *explicitly* specify a world carry an *implicit* actuality operator (P1). Given (P4), all such tacitly actualized propositions are thus true necessarily if true at all, i.e. *P → NP*. As regards Sam's thought about the weather in Paris, MacFarlane complains, the procedure of 'bringing the world of the context into the content of Sam's thought would make this content a *necessary truth* about this possible world, rather than a *contingent truth* about the weather in Paris' (quoted above). This, the modal moral is supposed to be, is deeply counterintuitive.

Before demonstrating that it isn't so counterintuitive after all, a quick word on another alleged counterintuitive consequence, namely the fact that Sam's thought, which was supposed to be *about* the weather in Paris now appears to be *about* this possible world. But, of course, the demand for completeness does not give rise to a change in grammatical subject or sentential topic. MacFarlane is punning on 'about'. In its first occurrence, 'about' is used in its straightforward pre-theoretical sense according to which a sentence S is about x if x is the grammatical subject of S. The second occurrence of 'about' invokes Perry's *technical* sense of a thought being *about* a world w if w is a constituent of the propositional content, rather than *concerning* a world w if a world-neutral proposition must be evaluated with respect to a parameter w featuring in the circumstance. The argument is purely rhetorical. If Sam's thought does indeed tacitly make reference to the world of utterance (the actual world), it is a thought about the weather in Paris no less. And it is not at all implausible that the thought is about *the weather in Paris in the actual world*, since Sam has rather little reason to wonder whether to wear coat and hat in Twin-Earth Paris or some other world.

5. Modal Anxiety

What drives MacFarlane's modal anxiety is, I suspect, a very similar intuition which characterised early reactions to Kripke's (1972) contingent *a priori* and necessary *a posteriori*. Statements of this sort arise as a consequence of rigid designation, a feature in virtue of which certain expressions such as proper names or natural kinds designate the same individuals in all possible worlds. As I hope to show in detail below, the privileged role the actual world plays in determining the extension of such expressions and the *prima facie* paradoxical statements it engenders, is exactly what is at work as regards the

alleged necessity of contingent propositions when actualized. The point, however can be made at an intuitive level. Presume the content *P* of Sam's thought carries an implicit reference to the actual world, such that *P* is 'It is 0° C at the base of the Eiffel Tower at noon local time on February 22, 2005 [in the actual world].' As MacFarlane highlights, P, *if true*, is true necessarily. But the necessity at stake need *not* clash with our intuition that the content of Sam's thought is as contingent as they come. This is evident from the fact that it is true necessarily *if* true at all. Though actualized propositions are always necessary (that is, necessarily true or necessarily false), *whether* they are true or false in the first place depends on contingent features of reality. Even if the content of Sam's thought happens to be true, and is thus true necessarily, it still holds good that if it had been the case that it was 20° C at the base of the Eiffel Tower on February 22, 2005, the content of Sam's thought would have been false.

6. Two Types of Necessity and Contingency

The above considerations imply that there are two different kinds of necessity (and, correspondingly, two types of contingency) – a suggestion which is hardly news. Following Evans (1979), whose distinction is more fully elaborated by Davies and Humberstone (1980), we'll label them 'superficial necessity' and 'deep necessity':

> **Necessity$_s$**: A sentence or content *p* is superficially necessary iff *p* is true in all possible worlds.

> **Necessity$_D$**: A sentence or content *p* is deeply necessary iff *p* is (actually) true no matter which possible world is actual.[9]

The actualized and hence world-specific proposition entertained by Sam is superficially necessary yet deeply contingent. Though matters epistemic are of no particular concern as regards MacFarlane's example, it is helpful to discuss his response to the incompleteness worry in the context of the contingent *a priori*, and, in particular, the necessary *a posteriori*. By aid of the distinction between the two types of necessity, we can dispel modal anxiety in similar ways as Evans and his followers countered the widespread contention that Kripke cases 'constitute an intolerable paradox' (Evans, 1979:161).[10]

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[9] The formulations are borrowed, with slight modification, from Hanson (2006, p. 448).

[10] Evans is principally concerned with the contingent *a priori*, but the strategy carries over to the necessary *a posteriori* (cf. Davies & Humberstone, 1980), which is our primary focus.

The content of Sam's thought is necessarily true in the superficial sense *if true*, yet the assessment whether it is true in the first place is a matter of empirical inquiry. Sam's thought can thus be seen as an instance of the necessary *a posteriori*,[11] the perplexing epistemic status of which is frequently considered a direct consequence of the deep contingency which Sam's thought intuitively manifests The case bears considerable likeness to classical examples of the necessary *a posteriori*, for instance 'scientific identities' like 'Water = H_2O'. The similarity is even more obvious as regards (deeply) contingent propositions which involve an 'actually' operator, which constitute a 'fund of simple examples of the necessary *a posteriori*' as Davies and Humberstone (1980, p. 10) point out. Given that grass is green in the actual world, 'Grass is actually green' is true in all possible worlds and hence superficially necessary. Still, it could have been the case that grass were orange, hence 'Grass is actually green' is not true no matter which world is considered actual – it is deeply contingent.

The same holds for scientific identity statements. If 'Water = H_2O' is in fact true, it is true in all possible worlds, since expressions denoting natural kinds designate rigidly. However, the chemical composition of water can only be determined by means of empirical enquiry, it is known *a posteriori*. And it is *a posteriori* in virtue of its deep contingency. If it had been the case that water were XYZ, 'Water = H_2O' would have been false. In fact, the expression 'water' can be understood as involving a tacit reference to the actual world. Putnam, in certain moods, describes it as involving such an indexical element, and Davies and Humberstone suggest to conceive of 'water' as a descriptive name (a name whose reference is fixed by description) featuring an implicit 'actually' operator. On this proposal, 'water' is short for 'the actual watery stuff hereabouts' and we have effectively the same sort of case as the one MacFarlane is worried about.

What exactly *are* deep necessity and contingency, and how do they differ from superficial necessity and contingency? A sentence *S*, for Evans, manifests *superficial* contingency, iff there is a world in which *S* is false, that is, if neither '□*S*' nor '¬□*S*' are true. Contingency in this sense is a property of a sentence which 'depends upon how it embeds inside the scope of modal operators' (Evans, 1979, p. 179). By contrast, deep contingency is introduced not with respect to a sentence's behaviour when embedded under standard modal operators, but with regards to 'what *makes* it true': 'If a deeply contingent statement is true, there will exist *some state of affairs* of which we can say both that had it not existed the statement would not have been true, and that

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[11] Not an unusual move, cf. Davies and Humberstone (1980) as well as (Davies, 2004).

it might not have existed' (Evans, 1979, p. 185). Conversely, a statement is deeply necessary if it is true independently of which world turns out actual and hence cannot be falsified by contingent features of reality.

What is captured by superficial necessity is a *property of modal sentences* – sentences, that is, which invoke, tacitly or explicitly, some reference to some particular world. A sentence S and its actualized version AS can come apart in terms of superficial necessity, because necessity in this sense is responsive to the modal features of the sentence, in this case the 'actually' parameter. Deep necessity, on the other hand captures not a *property of modal sentences*, but a *modal property of sentences*.[12] Necessity or contingency regarding a sentence *S* and its actualized version *AS* do not come apart, since necessity in this sense is *unresponsive* to the modal element in 'AS'. In the deep sense, *S* and *AS* are both contingent if dependent on which world happens to turn out actual, or else both necessary in so far as they hold no matter which world happens to turn out actual.

7. Conclusion

Let's take stock: Non-indexical contextualism is in no better a position to account for disagreement than indexical contextualism, as long as the truth-conditionally complete proposition is understood as distributed over content *and* circumstance. To account for disagreement, radical measures are required: The object of disagreement, assertion and belief must be conceived as the perspective-neutral content or lekton itself. Such stoic propositions or thin contents, however, have a whiff of semantic incompleteness about them, and it is doubtful at best whether they can serve to individuate, understand and explain our propositional attitudes and the actions they drive.

However, MacFarlane alleges, the incompleteness worry overgenerates. Building perspective tacitly into the content of taste-claims carries a fully specific proposition on its heels: The time and world features are in no relevant way distinct from perspective, and thus need to be included in the propositional content, too. As regards worlds, this raises a problem. Once a contingent proposition is made modally specific, for instance by including an implicit 'actually' parameter, it is true in all possible worlds. But a semantics that confers necessary modal status onto all contingent propositions is deeply troublesome. Hence, semantic completeness must be resisted on pains of modal anxiety.

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[12] Cf. Davies and Humberstone (1980), as well as Davies (2004, pp. 95, 96).

Tacitly world-specific contingent propositions such as 'Grass is green [in this world]' or 'Grass is [actually] green', I suggested, raise as much of a paradox as necessary *a posteriori* statements do, under which category they can plausibly seen to fall: None whatsoever. They are necessary in a *superficial* sense, that is, true at all possible worlds only in virtue of the modal element in the content. They are not necessary in a deep sense, because had another world turned out actual, 'Grass is [actually] green' would have been false. The truth of such world-specific propositions is thus, rather unperplexingly, just as dependent on features of contingent reality as the truth of their world-neutral equivalents (their semantic values co-vary). The threat of modal mayhem employed to fend off the incompleteness worry must not be taken seriously. *Pace* MacFarlane, and in line with Davies, superficial necessity must be understood as a largely innocent feature of modal sentences. What matters is that contingent propositions rest deeply contingent if world-specific:

> A sentence is *true in a world* just in case, if that world were actual, the sentence would be *true*. This notion of truth *simpliciter*, or absolute truth, is the *familiar and philosophically fundamental notion of truth* as the normative end of assertion and judgment. So, there is a close conceptual connection between the notions of deep necessity, being made true by a state of affairs and truth in a world, on the one hand, and the truth of assertions or utterances and the correctness of judgments or thoughts, on the other.' (2014, pp. 86,87, italics added)

MacFarlane's attempt to come to the rescue of radical nonindexicalism and other thin content views thus fails in two regards. It conflates two distinct notions of necessity. His argument is hence unsound. But it is also invalid: If modal anxiety *were* a serious problem, it could at best constitute motivation for *moderate* nonindexical contextualism. Since moderate nonindexical contextualism cannot account for faultless disagreement either, however, we have little reason to think that this notational variant is a *better* alternative to indexical contextualism.

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